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This chapter maps public funding for film in the UK and explores some of the contradictions between
stated policy aims and outcomes, particularly on the issue of “creative labour”. Via the now well-
established and relatively substantial public funding systems for film production that exist in the UK,
considerable public funds are directed towards transnational corporate interests and their national partners,
a policy approach that we call “a corporate welfare system” for the UK film industry. This system has had
considerable success on its own terms, leveraging massive investment into UK film infrastructure, and has
provided a blueprint for the economic development of other creative industries. However, it has also
hindered wider policy commitments towards diversity and equality in the film workforce. It is argued that
policy objectives to improve opportunities for underrepresented groups such as women, ethnic minorities,
disabled people and people of working class origin are unlikely to be successful unless more direct
interventions can be developed.
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1.  The British Film Industry: Tax Relief and the Problem of Equality
The use of tax relief to attract inward investment has comprised the foundation of the UK film industry since
its introduction in 1992. Although the amounts and mechanisms of film tax relief have changed considerably
since then, the fundamental principle of offering massively reduced tax incentives to film producers remains,
and it has transformed the industry. The UK is now one of the most competitive places in the world to
produce feature films, and the industry is larger, makes more films, employs more people and generates more
money as a result (Olsberg SPI, 2015). Indeed, tax relief for film has proved so successful that a suite of
similar tax reliefs have been introduced across the creative industries: for animation (2013), high-end
television drama (2013), video games (2014), theatre (2014), children’s television (2015) and orchestras
(2016). Yet for all the benefits that tax relief affords the film industry in the UK, its primary beneficiaries are
the Hollywood studios and other major multinational media corporations. The vast majority of the inward
investment attracted by the tax relief system comes from Hollywood, and while this has helped boost
employment and developed the UK’s state-of-the-art facilities and world-leading talent and crews, the cost
has been—and continues to be—a publicly funded “corporate welfare system” worth hundreds of millions of
pounds to the British taxpayer, and a British film industry chiefly engaged in the production of Hollywood
cinema.
Arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of the UK film tax relief scheme are well rehearsed, as
we will show. However, our objective here is to explore a perspective that is much less discussed and make
an argument about the relationship between this mode of film funding and what we see as its damaging
implications for social justice and equality in terms of citizens’ opportunity to participate in the film industry
and film culture, what is called “diversity” in contemporary public discourse in the UK. First, we explore the
concept of corporate welfare and the emergence of commercial subsidy as a cornerstone of creative industries
policy in the UK. We then investigate how the corporate welfare system for film funding contributes to the
stratification of the UK production sector. Finally, we analyse the relationship between this system of funding
and production and the dismal levels of diversity in the industry workforce. We explore the multiplicity of
ways in which often indirect, unconscious and intersecting prejudices construct barriers that prevent equal
participation for women, ethnic minorities, disabled people and working class people, particularly to higher-
status creative roles, and how these barriers are structured into the largely freelance and informal labour
markets and labour processes upon which the success of the UK film industry is built. It is our central
argument that the current form of UK film funding maintains a structure and organisation of the film industry
that directly opposes one of the stated key priorities of UK cultural policy: to “promote a more diverse
workforce” (DCMS, 2008, p. 23).
2.  The “Corporate Welfare System” and the Depoliticisation of
Commercial Subsidy
The concept of the “corporate welfare system” features heavily in US debates on social and economic policy
and is generally a pejorative term referring to the practice of large corporations lobbying for, and receiving,
government subsidies (see Huff & Johnson, 1993; Nader, 2000). In contrast, in the UK, following the
“markets work best” doctrine of the 1980s, mainstream political consensus has held that subsidy of
commercial interests is a legitimate use of public money if it generates positive “externalities” such as the
creation of jobs or the provision of services (Whitfield, 2001).1
Debates on the subsidisation of commercial media and culture have a complex history that is bound up with
the development of the “cultural industries” approach to cultural policy in the 1980s and the subsequent
adoption of the “creative industries” as a policy paradigm and official sector of the economy in the late 1990s
(Flew, 2012; Garnham, 2005; Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005; Hesmondhalgh, Oakley, Lee, & Nisbett, 2015b;
Newsinger, 2012b; Schlesinger, 2007). Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015a, b) argue that New Labour’s cultural
policy was the result of a complex series of tensions between various institutional, political and social forces,
particularly social democratic policies aimed at redistributing cultural resources, contributing to social justice
and mitigating market failure, and others, perhaps best described as “neoliberal” in character, which were
designed to strengthen commercial activity and market operations. In this way, the corporate welfare system
for film might be understood as a representation of these tensions, containing at once a cultural concern for
the construction of an indigenous film culture, a social concern for the creation of employment and
opportunity and a more neoliberal concern that sees market operations, competition and commercial success
as the best mechanisms for economic growth and the allocation of resources.
However, while New Labour’s social and cultural programmes were a significant—although secondary—part
of the creative industries discourse, these concerns were ultimately subordinated to commercial interests. As
Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015b) argue, film policy in this period demonstrates “a privileging of the interests of
the cultural industries”, “less concern with cultural factors” and a “neglect of problematic working conditions
in the sector” (p. 122). Despite the continued vestigial attachment to social and cultural policy aims and
objectives, the dynamism of the creative industries discourse played a central role in delegitimising non-
market forms of cultural subsidy and depoliticising commercial subsidy. Thus, while public funding
increased during the New Labour period, this was part of a process of the stripping back of social democratic
values and practices, transferring cultural authority and material power ever increasingly to commercial
markets and corporate interests. This interpretation helps to explain the continuation and extension of creative
industries policy and practice after New Labour and its seamless continuity with a renewed Conservatism and
financial austerity (for a more detailed version of this argument, see Newsinger, 2012a, 2014).
From a technocratic public policy perspective, an evaluation of the corporate welfare system for film might
be posed as a question of balancing positive externalities with negative ones. However, as noted by a number
of critics, in the development of creative industries policy, questions about the pay and conditions for labour
rarely made it into the equation, being sidelined or ignored under the presumption that increased commercial
activity was an unmitigated public good (e.g. Banks & Hesmondhalgh, 2009; Oakley, 2013).
We want to suggest that the role of corporate welfare system in limiting democratic accountability and
maintaining systemic barriers to equal participation needs to be factored into this equation as a negative
consequence with much more weight than has previously been the case.
3.  Film Funding in the UK
Tax relief is the cause of most economic activity associated with feature film production in the UK. Of the
£1.4 billion (1.7 billion euros) spent in 2015, for example, the vast majority—83%, or £1.2 billion (1.4 billion
euros)—came from overseas, predominantly for Hollywood films made in the UK, such as Rogue One: A
Star Wars Story and Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Men Tell No Tales
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(BFI, 2016a, p. 3) (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1
UK spend of feature films produced in the UK, 1994–2015, £ million (BFI, 2016a, p. 3)
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By contrast, the total public funding for film production was a comparatively miniscule £414 million (481
million euros), of which more than half (61%) was automatically allocated to those films that qualify for the
film tax relief. Of the rest, most comes from the National Lottery (18%, in 2015), a state sweepstake scheme
set-up in 1995, central government (8%, in 2015) and the film production arms of the two main public service
broadcasters (PSBs), the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)/BBC Films and Channel 4/Film 4 (6%, in
2015) (BFI, 2016b, p. 3). The remainder consists of various investments of <2% from public bodies such as
the Arts Council, the EU’s MEDIA programme and various national and regional government departments
across the UK (BFI, 2016b, p. 4). In economic terms, then, the UK film industry makes mostly Hollywood
films that are attracted to the UK by its competitive, taxpayer-funded corporate welfare system.
That tax relief which is by far the single largest source of public funding for film in the UK is indicative of
the extent to which the film industry is valued in primarily commercial terms by the state. Rather than using
public funds to mitigate market failure, tax relief transfers those funds to the private sector and thereby boosts
the commercial operation of the industry by reducing the costs and risks involved in private investment. Of
course, the tax relief was ostensibly designed to benefit indigenous producers, and, to the extent that all films
which qualify can claim back 25% of the first £20 million (24 million euros) spent and 20% of any
subsequent spend, it does. However, because tax relief is proportionate to production spend, levels of subsidy
for big-budget films far exceed anything available to indigenous filmmakers because the latter make films
with considerably smaller budgets. Furthermore, the tax relief scheme has been so successful at attracting
runaway productions to the UK that many of the high-end crews and facilities are contracted out by big-
budget productions for much of the year and thus unavailable to independent producers. So, although the tax
relief keeps production levels high, which in turn maintains the skills base and keeps people in work, those
that ultimately benefit most from such stimulus are those organisations best placed to benefit from the
commercial side of the industry. Although this includes the handful of British production companies that
work with Hollywood finance (see below), the principal beneficiaries are the investors themselves:
Hollywood studios and other major multinational media corporations based overseas (Presence, 2017; Steele,
2015).
Tax relief was first introduced in 1992 as part of a raft of other measures designed to counter the effects of a
more extreme free-market approach to the film industry. In 1984, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative
administration removed all forms of government support for the industry—which she referred to as the
“paraphernalia of government intervention”—and brought the industry to the brink of collapse: investment in
production fell from £270.1 million (320.1 million euros) in 1986 to £49.6 million (55.6 million euros) in
1989, in which just 30 films were made (Hill, 1996, pp. 103–104). As well as tax relief, other interventions
included the establishment of the British Film Commission to attract inward investment in 1991; in 1993 the
UK joined Eurimages, the European fund for production, distribution and exhibition; and in 1995 National
Lottery funding for film was introduced, and the London Film Commission was established to attract inward
investment to the capital (Caterer, 2011). Aside from the UK’s membership of Eurimages (which was
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withdrawn in 1996),  the essence of these policies remains in place today despite significant changes to the
institutional infrastructures that oversee and administer them (Doyle et al., 2015). As such, the policy shift of
the 1990s marks the beginning of the current epoch of film policy in which the economic foundation of the
industry is based upon attracting inward investment via tax relief, while comparatively miniscule levels of
funding from the Lottery and PSBs support low- to medium-budget, “culturally British” film.
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4.  Film Production in the UK
Under the current rules, introduced in 2007 and revised in 2014, to benefit from the relief, films must both be
produced by a British production company and either pass a “cultural test” as a British film or be registered
as an official UK co-production.  The UK currently has bilateral co-production agreements with 12 other
countries, while the cultural test is a points-based system that allocates points based on content, language,
above- and below-the-line labour and so on (Table 1). This would appear to ensure that only culturally British
films, or British co-productions made by British companies, can benefit from the relief.
Table 1
Summary of points, cultural test for film
  Cultural test Points
A Cultural content  
A1 Film set in the UK or EEA 4points
A2 Lead character British or EEA citizens or residents 4points
A3 Film based on British or EEA subject matter or underlying material 4points
A4 Original dialogue recorded mainly in English or UK indigenous language or EEA language 6points
  Total Section A 18points
B Cultural contribution  
  The film demonstrates British creativity, British heritage and/or diversity 4points
  Total Section B 4points
C Cultural hubs  
C1 (a) At least 50% of the principal photography or SFX takes place in the UK 2points
  (b) At least 50% of the VFX takes place in the UK 2points
  (c) An extra 2 points can be awarded if at least 80% of principal photography or VFX or SFX takesplace in the UK
2
points
C2 Music recording/audio post-production/picture post-production 1point
Source: BFI (2017)
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  Cultural test Points
  Total Section C (maximum 4 points in total in C1) 5points
D Cultural practitioners (UK or EEA citizens or residents)  
D1 Director 1point
D2 Scriptwriter 1point
D3 Producer 1point
D4 Composer 1point
D5 Lead actors 1point
D6 Majority of cast 1point
D7 Key staff (lead cinematographer, lead production designer, lead costume designer, lead editor, leadsound designer, lead visual effects supervisor, lead hair and makeup supervisor)
1
point
D8 Majority of crew 1point
  Total Section D 8points
  Total all sections (pass mark 18) 35points
Source: BFI (2017)
However, because the tax relief is principally designed to attract inward investment, British companies
working with Hollywood finance must be able to qualify. Therefore, the so-called cultural test for British film
is sufficiently weak that Hollywood films made by British companies in the UK, such as Gravity (2013) or
Fast and Furious 6 (2013), can pass as culturally British and thus benefit from the scheme (Hill, 2016). Thus
Gravity, a film majority financed by Warner Bros. about two American astronauts in space, was eligible for
tax relief as a British film because it was produced by Heydey Films (the London-based company best known
for the Harry Potter franchise) and passed the cultural test because the dialogue was in English and it was
made in Pinewood Studios by crews from Britain and the European Economic Area and because its Mexican
writer and director reside in London. In effect, the rules governing tax relief ensure only that Hollywood
studios support the UK industry indirectly by forcing the studios to work with UK companies. Although this
benefits the UK film industry in several ways, it also has a variety of adverse effects of the production sector.
AQ6
Large but unpredictable levels of inward investment from the USA combined with inadequately low levels of
public subsidy have helped perpetuate a notoriously unstable film production sector that is small and
fragmented, divided across the two opposing sources of support on which it depends. UK film production is
heavily concentrated in London and the south-east and polarised between a large number of small,
independent companies and a small number of bigger companies with established ties to Hollywood.
Unsurprisingly, it is the small number of relatively large companies that makes the bigger-budget films (£10
million or above; 12 million euros or above) with Hollywood finance. Although these large-scale productions
represent the bulk of the overall UK production spend, they account for just a small fraction of the total films
produced. In 2015, for example, 201 films were made in the UK, yet just 15 big-budget (£30 million or
above; 36 million euros or above) films accounted for 73% of the total production spend (BFI, 2016a, p. 2).
The proportion of UK spend associated with inward investment films more generally was even higher: 83%.
The median budget for these inward investment films was £13.1 million (15.2 million euros); for domestic
UK films, the median was only £500,000 year (581,000 euros) (Table 2).
Table 2
Median feature film budgets, £ million, 2009–2015
Production category 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Inward investment 18.45 13.09 17.64 1.58 11.24 12.61 13.10
Domestic UK 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.5
Co-production 1.35 2.56 1.10 1.05 1.01 1.40 1.27
Source: BFI (2016a, p. 8)
The handful of UK companies that work with Hollywood finance do of course benefit from the studios’
investment. This includes companies such as Working Title, Heydey Films and Scott Free Films. Most of
these companies have established ties to Hollywood or other major international media corporations: Working
Title is a subsidiary of Universal Pictures; Heydey Films has a first-look deal with Warner Bros., with which
it produced all eight films in the Harry Potter franchise; and Scott Free Films, Ridley Scott’s company, is run
by former Columbia Pictures executive, Michael Costigan, and is part of Scott’s wider content creation
company, RSA Films, which has offices in LA, Hong Kong and Shanghai. These companies are very
successful, but they are not representative of the industry overall. The vast majority of productions companies
are small, are independent and struggle from one project to the next, typically making one film per year with
the support of one of more of the three main funders: the BFI, BBC Films or Channel 4.
Despite their comparatively paltry resources, these funders support a wide range of independent British films
each year. Yet the small sums with which they work are insufficient to address the structural issues faced by
the production sector. The BFI’s Film Fund has an annual budget of around £26 million (31 million euros). It
finances approximately 25 major feature film awards each year and provides development support for around
100 more, as well as support for distribution and sales. This is the largest annual budget of all the public
funders by far, but is still £6 million (7 million euros) less than the £32 million (38 million euros) budget for
Paddington (2014), Heydey Films’ Studio Canal-financed film about the famous Peruvian bear, and is
positively dwarfed by the £132 million (156 million euros) spent (even before P+A costs) on Star Wars: The
Force Awakens (2015). After the BFI, Film 4 is the next largest: it currently consists of a £15 million (18
million euros) budget and aims to make between 10 and 12 films per year, while the BBC aims to produce 8
films per year with its budget of £11 million (13 million euros). Additional four agencies in each country of
the UK—Creative England, Film Cymru Wales (Film Agency Wales), Creative Scotland and Northern Ireland
Screen—also provide a range of smaller funding and development opportunities relating to their areas, as
does Film London, the screen agency for the UK’s film-making capital. These agencies are financed with a
mixture of government funds and, via the BFI, money from the National Lottery and award production funds
between £200,000 (237,000 euros) and £800,000 (948,000 euros).
As noted, the low- to medium-budget films supported by these public organisations comprise the majority of
features made in the UK each year.  Yet despite their mostly low budgets, because they rely on such poorly
resourced public funders, none of these films are single-source financed. Instead, projects financed by the
BFI, Film 4 and BBC Films use the backing of the public funder/s to secure further finance from a patchwork
of other sources, including the agencies above, presales from distributors and sales agents or contributions
from investment banks or private equity firms. With such a large number of stakeholders involved, this
patchwork or “jigsaw” financing model is complex, is time-consuming and has to be repeated for each
project.
5.  Funding, Production and Workforce Diversity
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The model of film funding that depends on tax relief has had remarkable success on its own terms. Although
it fluctuates each year, inward investment has risen steadily from £182.7 million (216.5 million euros) in
1994 to £356.8 million (422.9 million euros) in 2008, £752.7 million (892 million euros) in 2009 and £1.18
billion (2.1 billion euros) in 2015 (BFI, 2016a, p. 3; UKFC, 2010, p. 134). Unsurprisingly, these levels of
investment have proved popular with those figures in the industry that benefit from them. Michael Kuhn of
Qwerty Films, for example, describes the system as “fantastic” and designed “very cleverly, very effectively”
(House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2010, p. 27). Similarly, Ivan Dunleavy, chief
executive, Pinewood Group plc, describes it as “a clear demonstration of how [the] government has
supported UK Film and helped fuel growth in the creative industries to the benefit of the taxpayer” (Quoted
in Treasury Press Release, 21st August 2015, n.p.).
The British film industry and the corporate welfare system paradigm that supports it enables films to be made
in the UK, utilising UK talent and facilities and sometimes reflecting aspects of UK culture. As pointed out
by a number of critics, however, such success—measured primarily in terms of commercial and economic
competitiveness—has tended to sideline important questions about inequalities in access to labour markets
and poor conditions within them, questions that are only recently entering into mainstream debate (Banks &
Hesmondhalgh, 2009; Comunian, Faggian, & Jewell, 2011; Oakley, 2011, 2013). While a number of high-
profile initiatives by funders and broadcasters have sought to address the lack of diversity in the creative
industry workforce (Arts Council England, 2011; Creative Scotland, 2015; Creative industries Federation,
2016), little work has highlighted the role of public funding for film in maintaining the systemic barriers to
equality that characterise the industry.
That the industry has a problem with equality and diversity is beyond dispute. For example, according to
Creative Skillset’s Creative Media Census report, representation of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic
(BAME) people in the film production workforce fell from 12% in 2009 to 5.3% in 2012 (Creative Skillset,
2013). As noted by Keith Randle, only 1% of visual effects workers in 2012 were BAME, compared to 9% of
workers in all industries (Randle, 2015). In the same period, the proportion of the workforce reported by
employers as disabled also fell from 1.9 to 1.5% (Creative Skillset, 2013). While by some measures gender
representation in the film industry is roughly equal (47% in 2012), analysis has shown that key, high-status
creative roles tend to be male-dominated (Steele, 2013). Between 1999 and 2003, fewer than 15% of UK
films were credited to a female screenwriter (Sinclair, Pollard, & Wolfe, 2006), and the most recent film
credit analysis produced by the BFI (2014) shows that only 14% of directors and screenwriters were women
in 2012/2013 (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2
Film production workforce participation of women, BAME and disabled people, 2009–2012. Source:
Creative Skillset (2013, p. 31)
The persistent lack of diversity in the UK film industry workforce has been subject to considerable
investigation and analysis which has identified a range of interlinked causal factors. In 2007, an investigation
commissioned by the European Union’s European Social Fund found “little tangible evidence of direct
discrimination or overt prejudice against particular minorities” (Randle, Leung, & Kurian, 2007, p. 9).
Instead, it locates the barriers for marginalised social groups in the requirements of entry into and progression
in film labour markets. Those seeking to enter the workforce are often expected to obtain an undergraduate
degree and then work, often near London, for no or very low pay for a number of years which limits
participation to those with significant financial resources and/or support. Given the disproportionate
concentration of ethnic minorities in lower socio-economic categories, the lack of ethnic diversity in the
workforce may be more to do with the structural intersection of race and class than with racial prejudice and
discrimination (Randle et al., 2007, p. 10).
In a follow-up study on freelance women film and television workers, Leung, Rosalind Gill and Randle
isolate two major factors limiting gender equality: “informality” and “parenting”. They note that the “most
distinctive feature of recruitment in the sector is its informal, word of mouth nature” (p. 56), with people
being hired for short-term projects at short notice based on personal recommendations and previous working
relationships. Networking is seen as “a time-consuming and demanding requirement of freelancing” (p. 57)
which places additional burdens upon women. As personal trust is viewed by employers as vital, there is a
tendency towards “homophily”, “the practice of insiders recruiting in their own image, or selecting
candidates with whom they feel they have an easy rapport” (p. 57). Given that most decision makers tend to
be (white) men, this replicates existing gender inequalities. Parenting contributes to gendered inequality due
to the “automatic connection between gender and childcare” drawn in the sector, “taking for granted the idea
that parenting is primarily women’s responsibility” (p. 59). Leung, Gill and Randle outline two factors that
are sometimes conflated: a difficulty of balancing strenuous creative work with childcare for women who do
have children and the assumption that childless younger women will choose to have children, causing
employers to perceive them as less committed to work and invest fewer resources in them. Informality in
recruitment processes makes proving discrimination very difficult, while short-term contracts and the
importance of personal reputation mean workers are discouraged from complaining for fear of the damage
this will do to their careers (Leung, Gill, & Randle, 2015). As O’Brien (2014) argues, the “dependence on
informal networks for work and promotion” mean that “the question of gender bias could not be tackled or
addressed directly or formally” (p. 1216).
Research has also explored barriers to equal participation built into labour processes in the film industry. In
the only empirical study to explore the experiences of disabled film and television workers, Randle (2015)
notes a “double disablement” in access to film and television labour markets and in performing labour
processes prevalent in the sector. The traditional entry level role as a “runner” “involves long hours, low pay
and requires workers to respond quickly and to be highly mobile” (p. 12), all of which can inhibit people with
impairments. Disabled workers are socially and culturally excluded from professional networks and may also
be physically excluded from networking events which often take place in inaccessible social venues.
Although “few workers reported direct or overt forms of discrimination”, Randle argues that “discrimination
appeared to operate more insidiously” (p. 20).
In summary, participation in the film industry in the UK is highly unequal with persistent intersectional
barriers structured into labour markets and labour processes that discriminate in terms of gender, ethnicity,
disability and social class (Banks & Hesmondhalgh, 2009, p. 420; Bhavnani, 2007). This is now well known.
However, the extent to which this is a by-product of a system maintained through public funding has received
far less scrutiny. Doris Eikhoff and Chris Warhurst have argued that social inequalities in employment are a
direct result of the model of production in the creative industries. Short-term contracts, project-based work,
informal recruitment practices and the associated disproportionate reliance on freelance labour are a response
by employers to the inherent uncertainty as to what cultural products will be commercially successful,
placing the risks of cultural production upon workers themselves. This means that any attempts to increase
diversity that do not tackle the structure of the industry are likely to be unsuccessful. As Eikhoff and
Warhurst argue, “a meritocratic world of work cannot be delivered within the creative industries’ current
model of production” (Eikhof & Warhurst, 2013, p. 504).
The public policy response has, however, been slow and to date profoundly inadequate. For example, Mark
Banks and David Hesmondhalgh identify 2007’s Staying Ahead report as the first to identify problems in the
lack of diversity in the creative industry workforce. As they note: “the report chooses not to elaborate on the
causes and consequences of these social disparities. Nor does it suggest how labour markets might be
progressively reformed in order to overcome these problems. Instead, the ‘diversity’ issue is elided, and,
indeed, more substantively represented as a problem of individual rather than social origin” (Banks &
Hesmondhalgh, 2009, p. 423).
A good summary of the problem of diversity in New Labour film policy is made by Nwonka (2015). He notes
that “the film industry continued to resist an interrogation of the hegemonic employment practices” despite
mounting evidence that these played the fundamental role in reproducing inequality in the workforce. Instead,
underrepresentation was understood as rooted in a lack of formal qualifications and training opportunities for
ethnic minorities, the appropriate response being “a simplistic democratisation of previously unequal access
to filmic education” (p. 12). He continues: “In this way, the UKFC’s diversity agenda was energised by a
continuing evasiveness and a plethora of paradoxical impulses of discriminatory recruitment cultures, which
populate British film in an era of increasing inequality of opportunity” (p. 12). For Nwonka, “the very nature
of diversity has, paradoxically, performed a key role in maintaining the status quo” (p. 13).
6.  The UK’s Corporate Welfare System: Maintaining Systemic
Barriers
The main argument of this chapter is that the dominant mode of film funding in the UK, which we have
described as a corporate welfare model, maintains a structure and organisation of the film industry that
directly mitigates against addressing the lack of workforce diversity. As we have shown, this model emerged
in the 1990s and has continued apace since then and, while it has afforded a number of commercial benefits
to the industry, has contributed to the polarisation of the production sector.
On the one hand, a small number of established companies make films with Hollywood finance attracted by
the tax relief, high-end facilities and a highly skilled, flexible labour force, and on the other, a large number
of small companies rely on under-resourced public funders to leverage patchwork finance for low- to
medium-budget, culturally British films. The tax relief has cost the UK taxpayer an estimated £1.45 billion
(1.72 billion euros) between 2006 and 2014, yet policymakers, broadcasters and funders have been unable to
change discriminatory practices and cultures that characterise the industry. On the contrary, the structural
conditions that produce this lack of diversity have been strengthened. As we have argued, these conditions
represent barriers to participation that prevent selected disadvantaged groups in society from participating in
film production.
The significance of this point is twofold: firstly, that initiatives designed to increase diversity are unlikely to
be successful unless these underlying structures are addressed, and, secondly, that public funding for the film
industry suffers through a contradiction that runs to the very heart of cultural-creative industries policy, the
incompatibility of narrow corporate interests and wider sociocultural interests that emerge from civil society.
It is notable that there is evidence to suggest that many of the negative conditions that exist in the film labour
market and labour processes are mitigated, to some degree, within parts of the broadcast sector that have been
shielded from the full force of commercialisation in the period under scrutiny, such as the BBC and Channel
4 (see, e.g. Steele, 2013). While being progressively eroded, the production models and relatively high levels
of unionisation in these organisations provide a more stable and accountable platform for the integration of
social concerns within cultural production. If they are lost or significantly deregulated, as seems likely
(Presence, 2017), this will further emphasise the trends described above towards fragmentation, precarity and
inequality that pervade the UK film industry.
The “corporate welfare system” for film artificially increases the size and economic activity of the
commercial UK film sector but does nothing to use this leverage to shape the labour market or labour process
in favour of equality of participation. Consequently, the film industry benefits from substantial amounts of
public money without the requirement to address the structural issues that prevent women, working class
people, members of ethnic minorities and the disabled from participating in it. While this is a clear question
of social and economic justice, it also speaks to a profoundly important question about the distribution of
cultural and communicative resources. As Oakley rightly argues, “Who gets to make culture […] matters,
because it is how we understand ourselves as a society” (Oakley, 2013, p. 56).
All of the features of the UK film labour market described in this chapter—the high economic and cultural
capital required to gain entry, informal recruitment practices, “homophily”, short-term contracts and job
insecurity—are reflections of an industry where capital is strong and labour is weak. The pathological and
systemic lack of diversity that characterises the UK film industry is a symptom and expression of the power
of global media conglomerates to shape national and local labour markets in their own interests: highly
skilled, highly flexible production units available for short-term hire. If this argument is correct, then it
follows that any initiatives, policies or activities aimed at increasing workforce diversity to more equal levels
are unlikely to have anything more than short-term superficial effects unless it is combined with systemic
change that counterbalances the labour-capital power relationship more in favour of labour. The corporate
welfare model of public film funding is uniquely and fundamentally incapable of achieving these aims.
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